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POLICE SCIENCE LEGAL ABSTRACTS
AND NOTES
Joel W. Townsendf
Does a Defendant Have a Right to Examine Evidence in the Possession of the Police-Admissibilify in Evidence of Scientific TechniquesIn a prosecution of a father for first degree murder of his mentally
defective infant son, by electrocution, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts in the case of Commonwealth v. Noxon, 66 N.E. 2d 814 (1946),
affirmed the judgment and the sentence of death of the trial court
(which sentence was later commuted to life imprisonment). On appeal
to the supreme court many assignments of error were made by the
accused and the court considered and overruled all of them, only a
few of which will be mentioned here. The trial court in the exercise
of its discretion denied the defendant's motions, made before the indictment and before the trial, for permission for his attorneys and
experts to examine evidence in the possession of the police. This included personal property of the defendant, tissue removed from the
body of the baby and microscopic slides of the same, and various
photographs made by the police. The Supreme Court upheld the trial
court in its discretion in denying the motions to examine the evidence,
as the motions were not for a bill of particulars but were rather an
attempt to compel the Commonwealth to disclose, in part at least,
the evidence upon which it relied. It was within the trial judge's discretion to grant or deny the motions and there is no rule of law which
requires the Commonwealth to permit such examination or which
gives a defendant the right to ask for it.
The Supreme Court also sustained the trial court's ruling in admitting the following evidence: (a) testimony of an expert on electrothermal burns; (b) insulation from pipes in the garage to show that
none of the protective covering of the extension cord, from which the
infant had received the fatal shock, had 'rubbed off on the insulated
pipes while hanging in the garage as claimed by the defendant; (c)
like models of original extension cord prepared by the manufacturer
-the defendant having admitted destroying the original extension
cord; (d) a spectrograph plate of control skin taken from the infant's
arm and an analysis of skin taken from an experimental animal; (e) a
copper print test made by a state ch~inist for the presence of copper
on the back of the metal tray, on which, the infant was resting when
electrocuted-there being evidence that the ground essential to the
transmission of electricity through the body of the baby could have
been created by placing an exposed ground wire of a nearby radio
in contact with the tray.
Searches and Seizures-Disfincfion Between Seizures of "Private"
and "Public" Property-Waiver of Constitutional Rights-Evidence
Subject to Seizure Upon Otherwise Legal Search-Two important decisions with regard to illegal searches and seizures, were rendered
recently by the United States Supreme Court in Davis v. United
States, 66 S. Ct. 1256 (1946), and Zap v. United States, 66 S. Ct. 1277
(1946).
In the first case (Davis v. United States) the accused, a gasoline
station operator, was convicted of unlawfully having in his possession
gasoline ration coupons. Objection was made in the trial court by the
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accused to an-alleged illegal search of the premises and the seizure of
the coupons by federal agents who made the search and seizure without a search warrant. The United States District Court found that the
accused had voluntarily consented to the search. The Circuit Court of
Appeals in affirming the finding, expressed some doubt as to this consent being voluntary, but held that the seized coupons were properly
introduced into evidence because the search and seizure, being incidental to the arrest, were reasonable regardless of consent. The United
States Supreme Court affirmed that judgment (by 5 to 3 decision)
without reaching the question whether, but for that consent, the
search and seizure incidental to the arrest was reasonable. The Court
said that there is a difference between property to which the government is entitled to possession and private property to which it is not.
The court was of the opinion that any owner of property who seeks to
take it from one who is unlawfully in possession has greater leeway,
since the claim of ownership will justify even a trespass and authorize
steps otherwise unlawful. The Court held that the search and seizure
in the instant case did not violate the Fourth and Fifth Amendments
as the question here did not involve the search and seizure of private
papers, since the gasoline ration coupons remained at all times the
property of the government, sdbject to inspection and recall by it.
In other wokds, a custodian of public property does not have the same
immunity from search and seizure as the owner of private property.
The court added a word of caution in its opinion, stating that it was
not suggesting that officers seeking to reclaim government property
may proceed lawlessly and without restraint. In this case they appeared
on the premises during business hours, and had ocular evidence that
a misdemeanor had been committed. The search was of the office adjacent to the gasoline pumps where the accused transacted his business, there was no general exploratory search, and.only contraband
coupons were demanded and taken. The gasoline station was a place
of business, not a private residence, and the officer's claim to the property was one of. right. In such cases permissible limits of persuasion
are not so narrow as where private papers are sought. When the custodian is persuaded by argument that it is his duty to surrender such
property and he hands it over, duress and coercion will not be so
readily implied as where private papers are involved.
In the second case (Zap v. United States) the accused had a costplus contract with the Navy Department to do experimental work on
airplane wings and to conduct test flights. His contract granted to the
government the right to inspect his books, for the purpose of determining the accuracy of his charges. To falsify his records, the accused
arranged with a test pilot to make certain test flights and paid him
$2500. Prior to the test flights he had the pilot endorse a blank check,
later filled in the pilot's name as payee and $4000 as the amount of
the check, posted the check in his book of accounts and presented to
the Navy Department a voucher for the work under the contract.
Government agents made an inspection of the books of the accused,
during regular hours at his place of business, with the assistance of
employees of the accused. In the course of the investigation, the
agents discovered the check in question and the accused, learning of
the investigation, protested to the agents against the examination of
his book and the seizure of the check. At the trial the check was
admitted in evidence over the objection of the defendant that the
search and seizure of the check was illegal. The trial court convicted
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the defendant for the crime of presenting false claims against the
United States.
The United States Supreme Court, in affirming (by 5 to 3 decision)
the conviction in the Zap case, cited the first of these two cases, Davis
v. United States, and said that the rights of the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments may be waived, and when the accused, in order to obtain
the government's business specifically agreed to permit inspection of
his accounts and records, he voluntarily waived such claim to privacy,
even though he later protested against the examination and seizure of
the check. Though consent to the inspection did not include consent
to the taking of the check, there was no wrongdoing in the method by
which the incriminating evidence was obtained. The government
agents were lawfully on the premises during regular hours at the
place of business, and no force or threat of force was employed; therefore they obtained access to the documents by lawful means. Even if
it be assumed that the taking of the check was unlawful, the Fourth
and Fifth Amendments would not make inadmissible in evidence the
knowedge which had been legally obtained, and would not preclude
the agents from testifying concerning those facts. Consequently, it
was within the sound discretion of the District Court to admit the
check in evidence.
The dissenting 'opinion in each of the above cases stated that the
constitutional prohibition is directed not only at illegal searches, but
likewise condemns invalid seizures; . that the legality of the search
does not automatically legalize every accompanying seizure; and that
to hold otherwise is to overlook the requirement that a search warrant
shall particularly describe the things to be seized and does not permit
general searches and the seizure of one thing under a warrant issued
for something else.
In reference to the first case (Davis v. United States), the dissent
said that to hold the search legal is to hold that a search which could
not be justified under a search warrant is lawful without it. The crime
was only a misdemeanor, and no arrest can be made for a misdemeanor
without a warrant unless it be committed in the presence of the arresting officers. Prior to the search, the officers had no basis for stating
that the accused, in their presence, had committed the crime of
possessing coupons illegally. The dissent then pointed out that the
essence of the difference in the constitutional protection afforded the
possessors of private and public papers, is that, under appropriate
circumstances, wholly private papers are not subject even to testimonial compulsion, whereas other papers, once they have been legally
obtained, are available as evidence. The character of the papers does
not eliminate the restrictions of the Fourth Amendment and subject
the person in possession of such documents, against his protest, to
searches and seizures otherwise unwarranted. Further, the dissent
contends, an even more fundamental issue lurks in the court's opinion
if the phrase about the locus of the search and seizure as "a place of
business, not a private residence" is intended to carry relevant legal
implication, for if this is an indirect way of saying that the Fourth
Amendment only secures homes against unreasonable searches and
seizures but not offices, it constitutes a sudden and drastic break
with the whole history of the Fourth Amendment and its application
by the court.
In reference to the second case (Zap v. United States), the dissent
pointed out that if materials-the very possession or concealment of"

